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Reviews

A Review of Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese
State
By Andres Freeman
Xinjiang is located in Central Eurasia, and is a culturally diverse
conduit for trade in ideas, technology, religion, and biology
throughout Eurasia. In the last three centuries, borders have
become more sharply defined by the and Qing-Muscovite empires,
especially after the toppling of the Dzungar Empire, which isolated
the nomadic and semi-sedentarized: Kazaks, Dungun, TurkicSpeaking people, Uyghur, Oriats and Khalkha Mongols, to their
periphery. The Northern region, which is proximal to Russia, is
rich in mineral wealth, while the central pasturelands keep
nomadic herds alive, and the southern portion serves as the
agricultural basin, along with its oil supply located in the central
Tarim Basin. As Moscow and Beijing grew their states, and the
race for oil was on between the U.S. and Europe in the Middle
East, Xinjiang served as the Sino-Russo chess board, where each
agitated in the others disenfranchised Central Asian minorities. It is
with the factors aforementioned that the common people of
Xinjiang’s ethnic-elites, where agents caught primarily between
Moscow and Beijing, as they wrestled to maintain ethnic populist
control in Xinjiang’s political, as well as socio-economic
participation.
Ethno-populism shaped Xinjiang’s political climate from
the late Qing Empire, until present day, which offers some insight
on the complexities of political discourse and policy, regarding
China’s Uighur population. This review of Justin Jacobs’ Xinjiang
and the Modern Chinese State is limited in detail due to the
immensity of Eurasia’s complex history and symbiotic
relationships regarding state building across the continent, which
fall outside of this works scope, but should not deter scholars
engaging with the intricate details Jacobs work covers. It is flexible
enough to connect many common, misinformed nationalist
narratives and deconstruct them with incidents, which parallel a
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global trend of repressive measures the people of Central Asia
experienced in the twentieth century. Though the work could use
more personal accounts from non-elites in Xinjiang, it links the
particular insight that political, or military leaders, bring as far as
on the ground experiences in governorship, to the three eras
covered. Historians and social scientists should familiarize
themselves with this source material, at least as a baseline
understanding, of the Uyghur discussion in modern Chinese
Eurasian history.
Since the nineteenth century, competitive state building in
Europe, permeating ideas of self-determination, which often are
followed by the exploitation of ethnic differences amongst
interrelating corporate groups and authority figures, shocked the
world including China. In Xinjiang, the political strategy during
the end of the Qing Imperial Dynasty (1644-1911), the Republican
Period (1912-1949) and the People Republic of China era of the
Chinese Communist Party (1949-present), are similarly
characteristic of other frontier colonial campaigns. As such, ethnopopulist politics have continually hindered the respective eras
process of reconciliation with colonialisms permeation through
Beijing's progressive policy and continually widens the sociopolitical gap between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities in China.
Each respective era of Xinjiang’s governors employs ethnopopulist policies as strategy, by utilizing ethnic-elites and
corporate groups, to garner popular political support in maintaining
Han dominance of the region. In addition, the methodology, along
with the ideological approach, changes with geopolitical strategy
in mind. Jacobs doesn’t directly express the role that western
conquest for oil brought the global economy, but does explain the
strategic interest for Russia in Xinjiang, which is linked to the
political motivations that carried the global community through a
brutal multi-century war, for control of the global economy.
Jacobs’s main point is that the findings of his research indicate a
snafu in the semantics of the nation state model. To Jacobs, China
should be referred to as a National Empire because of its lack of
reconciliations with the Qing Dynasty’s imperial expansion, a
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distinct model from the Soviet model of a Nation of Empires, and
by focusing on the geopolitical climate during the three eras of
governors in Xinjiang, his examples illuminate the significance
that Han chauvinism plays in creating tension between Beijing and
the capital Urumqi.
Jacobs is a historian of modern China who authored
Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State and currently teaches at
American University, where he teaches courses on modern China,
East Asian civilization, Indiana Jones in History, and the Japanese
Empire. His research concerns the northwestern Chinese
borderlands, comparative Eurasian empires, and the historical
politics of archaeological expeditions. His background of study
puts his research dead in the middle of strategically significant
regions of Central Asia and gives a platform to correlate the geopolitical watershed events, as an explanation for the collision and
aftershock in Xinjiang.
Governor Yang Zengxin was a Han ruler of non-Han
people first and foremost, from 1912-28, however his brand of
ethnic-populist policy was continued from Qing era bureaucratic
structures that his frontier experience was steepened in, leaving
him a better understanding of how to govern the frontier as
opposed to Han-Manchu officials in Beijing, during the Republic
era. To avoid creating another outer Mongolia, Yang requested less
aggressive tactics from Beijing, and to send arms so that the
predominantly Uyghur and Kazak people of the regions could
govern its borders, before the Soviets offered a sweeter deal. Yang
postured as a defender of non-Han interest, while warding off
competition with the Bolshevik encouraged ideas of selfdetermination. Ensuring Han rule of traditionally non-Han land
was ultimately Yang's motivation for his request for arms, though
it was not received as such by Beijing. Yang’s tenure in 1924 when
he had Sino-Muslim General of Xinjiang’s Kashgar district, Ma
Fuxiang, killed for his involvement in conspiring to assassinate
him illustrates his character. Instead of bidding on the behalf of
disenfranchised non-Han people who popularly supported such
deviations, Yang blamed Ma’s mistreatment of the Uyghur’s under
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him as the cause, subsequently brushing over the totality of
growing discontent in Xinjiang. Ma was installed to prevent
British, Japanese, and Russian agitation in the Mongol population,
but soon began to favor the Soviets, over the Han-Chauvinists, or
the former Qing Government, which prompted Yang to exploit this
dynamic for his own political gain.
The competition between Bolshevik Russia and China
during the republican period influenced many of the ethnic-elite
partnerships, that were a continuation of ethno-populist policy,
weakening Beijing's already brittle claim of Xinjiang as part of
China under the auspices of Zhonghua Minzu, especially in the
city of Ili. Sheng Shikai used Soviet Style Nationalism to patronize
Uyghur Nationalist, in part by giving the non-Han people a limited
political platform. In one of Xinjiang’s more Soviet friendly
regions, there was a monopoly over the extraction of the
province’s agricultural and mineral wealth, which is why in (19341937) the U.S.S.R. shelled out an 8 million dollar investment, to
garner popular support from the Turkic speakers, Mongol and
other non-Hans in the region. The relationship diminished because
of the implanting of a Russian consulate in China's Kazak
inhabited Ili, which resulted in the soviet backed Ili Rebellion
(1944), where a coalition government rose from East Turkistani
separatist (ETIM), who were brutally put down by the Kuomintang
nationalist party. The ETIM were a party who called for national
sovereignty from China, with support from primarily Western
powers through Xinjiang’s exiles, and Taiwan, following the
Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power. The competitive
relationship between the two shifted as China strayed away from
the Austro-Marxism, where the ideological restructuring put
loyalty to the Chinese state above the Soviet model, which in
combination with agitation of Kazaks and Uyghurs, marked the
early years of Sino-Soviet estrangement.
Jacobs points out that the Chinese Communist Party used
ethno-populist control via affirmative action as an extension of
ethno-populist political strategy, where politically charged Han
migration into Xinjiang, facilitated the CCP’s commandeering of
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political power from the splintered separatist. In designating
Xinjiang, a special Autonomous region, the CCP crippled
minorities route of autonomous political participation by diluting
the concentration of non-Hans and removed the platform for
organic leadership to thrive. The shift in Beijing’s relation to
Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, also kept the exiled separatist out,
facing the difficult position of fighting their way into the state, as
opposed to Autonomy. Jacobs uses his concept of National Empire
to explain why policy in Xinjiang unfolded as it did, however, in
the context to geo-politics and strategy, serves a joint purpose of
having a larger presence to offset Beijing’s past neglect, and to
limit the influence of Europeans who had been agitating in the
region since the Opium Wars. Regardless of stance, the people of
Xinjiang endured the brunt of any adverse effects, as elites and
middlemen used their client relationships, during the early years of
the Cold War.
In current day 2020, the condition of the Uyghur’s of
Xinjiang has been a critical question posed by human rights groups
and media outlets, most of which are western based or associated
to the U.S. in a geo-economic client capacity. Correspondence with
strong criticism of Beijing of holding Uighur’s in detention camps,
often characterizes them Holocaust era concentration camps,
subsequently ignoring anti-Semitism being a European
phenomenon and the direct support of brutal Israeli occupation of
Palestine in line with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Washington’s
stance is not surprising, the Bush administration brandished the
Eastern Turkistani Independence Movement a terrorist
organization in 2002, which served two significant roles related to
this reading: the application of Neoconservative foreign policy
through the Bush Doctrine, as outlined in U.S. Plan for New
American Century, and facilitating a mutual benefit of not having
to address campaigns in Central Asia, which would implicate the
U.S. Global War on Terror Campaign on Afghanistan as a Geostrategic imperial venture. With this dynamic in mind, it is also
important to recognize the role globalization plays in state-to-state
interactions considering Afghanistan and Xinjiang's proximity to
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each other and what these borderlands mean in terms of the Geostrategy of economic warfare into the twenty-first century.
The US dollar is used to buy oil products in the world
market, where it funds its ventures by storing the excess printed
money in other countries' national reserves, which hides inflation
on its end and ensures the direct exchange in petrodollars, whose
value is supported by other countries’ use of the USD. In other
words, the other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, buy our debt,
which clears us up to continue state building ventures, but allows
the U.S. to impose brutal sanctions on “non-compliance,” or
trading without the USD. Recently, Russia, China, Iran, and
Venezuela, to name a few, are already working on moving away
from the USD, due to the effect the harsh sanctions have on their
economies. This is significant because the energy crisis that
plagued the twentieth century is the root cause for western interest
in the Middle East and Central Eurasia, into the twenty-first
century.
The Russo-Afghan War kept Beijing isolated into the Deng
era, while bleeding the Soviet Union to its collapse, where the
liberalization campaigns and subsequent globalization facilitated
the infiltration of the U.S and Britain’s intelligence agencies into
strategic locations such as Tibet, where Taiwan became a major
point of Western involvement in agitating near large Uyghur exile
communities. Though many of the reports pertaining to Xinjiang
are questionable at best, it is beneficial for the Uyghur community
to be acknowledged and its reports of abuse to be validated: the
lack of an ability to engage in representational politics removes
actual autonomy in Xinjiang and is clearly a product of centuries
of pacified reconciliation with Qing Imperial expansion. Jacobs
argues ethno-elitist/ethno-populist pacification makes China a
National Empire, which I believe suggests the Uyghur’s of
Xinjiang have not been afforded a true chance at autonomy. As
proxy conflict functions, the decisions large states make, have real
and oftentimes tragic effects for the inhabitants whose everyday
lives are in direct contact with bullets flying overhead, as opposed
to those who supply and instruct their factions from behind a desk,
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distant from the shockwaves of warfare. The research presented in
Jacobs work should be carried forward into a mainstream
discussion, that facilitates a clean break in dialogue from orientalist
interpretations of history, which often parade around Islamophobic
rhetoric, xenophobia, or sympathies for imperialism, like HanChauvinism does.
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